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motion,x6 it might have held that the defendant in the instant case had waived this
right by his failure to secure a ruling on his motion in the trial court. 7 The result that
there could be only one appeal from the trial court's ruling on one of two alternative
motions accords with the policy of the modem practice acts to avoid "piece-meal" appeals.' 8 In the case of Montgomnery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,19 however, the United States
Supreme Court held that the failure of the moving party to secure a ruling by the trial
court on his alternative motion for new trial, when it granted his motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, did not constitute waiver of his right to have this motion
considered after reversal of the judgment. The court suggested that in the future the
trial judge rule upon both alternative motions at the same time.2 This suggestion was
2
also implied in the present decision. X
Both decisions leave the implementing of these suggestions to the diligence of the
litigants. Thus the non-moving plaintiff may frequently be placed in the anomalous
position of desiring trial court rulings upon both motions of the defendant. In contrast, the defendant, interested in prolonging the litigation until the funds of the plaintiff are exhausted, may be willing that his alternative motion for new trial go unconsidered so that the case must be remanded for ruling upon that motion if the plaintiff's first appeal is successful. This situation might be avoided by amendment of Section 68(3)c to provide that the trial judge must rule on each of the motions and that ap22
peal from the ruling on one brings up the other for review also.

Procedure-Federal Employers' Liability Act-State Court Injunction of Proceeding in Federal Court-[Ohio and Federal].-Section 56 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act' provides that a railroad may be sued for damages arising out of employment in interstate commerce in a district court of the United States or a state court in
any one of three places: the district of the residence of the defendant, the district in
which the cause of action arose, or any district in which the defendant shall be doing
x6 Huber v. Van Schaack Mutual, Inc., 368 11. 142, 13 N.E. (2d) 179 (1938); Le Menager v.
Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 3ox Ill. App. 260, 22 N.E. (2d) 710 ('939); cf. Kauders v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 299 Ill. App. x52, i9 N.E. (2d) 630 (1939). Contra: Herb v.
Pitcairn, 3o6 Ill. App. 583, 29 N.E. (2d) 573 (1940).
'7 Cf. Ill. Civ. Prac. Ann. (McCaskill, Supp. x936) i8-i.
'g At common law the granting of a new trial was discretionary with the trial court; no exception could be taken to the ruling of that court. See Sinopoli v. Chicago R. Co., 316 Ill.
609, 147 N.E. 487 (1925). Section 77 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act provides that appeals
may be taken from orders granting a new trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 110, § 201; Wettaw v.
Retail Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 285 Ill. App. 394, 2 N.E. (2d) 162 (1936). Although an order
denying a motion for new trial is generally not an appealable order, making such a motion may
be a prerequisite to urging various other errors. Peirce v. Ott, 201 Ill. App. 46 (1915); Ill. Civ.
Prac. Ann. (McCaskill, 1933) 292-93.
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U.S. 243 (1940).

2" Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 253 (1940).
"1Sprague v. Goodrich, 32 N.E. (2d) 897, 9oo (Il. 1941).

"Cf. Rule XIV, Washington Rules of Practice, 193 Wash. 5o-a, 5i-a (1938); Simkins, Federal Practice § 702 (1938).

'35 Stat. 65 (i9o8) as amended by 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-59 (1928).
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business at the time of commencing such action. Two decisions have recently raised
the following problems with respect to the act: (i) Has a state court jurisdiction to
enjoin a resident of the state from prosecuting an action for damages under the act in
a federal district court in a foreign state on the ground that the action there is oppressive to the defendant? and (2) Can a federal court issue a counter-injunction on the petition of the original plaintiff?
In one case the plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, started suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the defendant railroad, which
was doing business in that district, to recover damages under the act for personal injuries sustained by him in Ohio while performing his duties as a brakeman in interstate
commerce. The railroad brought suit in a county court in Ohio to enjoin the plaintiff
from further maintaining and prosecuting his suit in the New York federal court since
it subjected the railroad to unnecessary expense and inconvenience. The plaintiff demurred, and the demurrer was sustained. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
held, that state courts cannot enjoin a resident of the state from prosecuting an action
arising within the state under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a federal court
of another state having jurisdiction of such action, even though its prosecution in the
federal court of another state may cause great inconvenience and expense to the defendant. Judgment affirmed, one justice dissenting. Baltimore & Ohio R1.Co. v. Kep2
ner.
In the other case, a resident of Tennessee sued in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on a cause of action arising in Tennessee.
The railway, alleging unnecessary inconvenience and expense, obtained an injunction
in the state court of the plaintiff's domicil purporting to restrain her from prosecuting
her action in the federal court in Missouri or anywhere else except in certain designated
federal and state courts within a limited distance of the site of the accident. The federal court, upon the plaintiff's filing of a supplemental bill in the original suit, issued an
injunction against the railway to enjoin it from enforcing the injunction of the Tennessee court. On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held, that the injunction of the Tennessee state court is void for lack of jurisdiction, and the federal court may issue an injunction to protect its jurisdiction under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. judgment affirmed. Southern R. Co. v. Painter.3
It is well settled that a state court of equity may restrain a citizen of the state from
instituting or maintaining a suit in the courts of another state on a cause of action not
arising there,4 if the defense of such suit in the foreign state would impose an unreasonable and inequitable burden upon the defendant.s The question arises as to whether
Congress intended Section 56 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to be subject to
this equitable qualification. The act has been construed as not taking away the power
2 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N.E. (2d) 982 (i94o), aff'd 61 S. Ct. 841 (1941) by a 4-4 decision.
The resignation of Mr. Justice McReynolds had reduced the membership of the Court to eight.
3 117 F. (2d) oo (C.C.A. 8th 1941).
4 Jurisdiction of the equity court is over the person of the equity defendant by reason of
domicil within the jurisdiction of the court.
5 Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933); New York,
C. & St. L. R..Co. v. Matzinger, r36 Ohio St. 271, 25 N.E. (2d) 349 (i94o); Reed's Adm'x
v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 2o6 S.W. 794 (igi8); cf. Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La.

x5, 95 SO. 385 (1922).
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of the state court of the domicil to restrain out-of-state suits in state courts on local
causes of action, since the act does not require state courts to take cognizance of suits
under the act, but merely empowers them to do so.' Congress did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the state courts, which jurisdiction is defined by the state which created
them.7 Consequently, when an out-of-state action in a state court is enjoined by the
domiciliary state court or dismissed by the foreign state court, the plaintiff is not denied
a federal right under the statute.8 In both of the principal cases it was contended that
the act is subject to the same equitable qualification when the action is brought in a
foreign federal court. The affirmance of the Kepner case by the United States Supreme
Court does not provide a satisfactory answer to this contention, since the affirmance
was by an evenly divided court without opinion. But it may be argued in behalf of the
result sustained by the Court, that when a state court attempts to enjoin a plaintiff
from prosecuting a cause of action under the act in an out-of-state federal court, the
injunction, if allowed to stand, would deny the plaintiff a federal right,9 granted under
the act, to sue in any district in which the defendant is doing business at the time the
action is commenced. Thus, it has been held that a state statute cannot prevent the
removal of transitory causes of action to foreign federal courts.' 0
Section 56 may, however, reasonably be interpreted to be subject to the equitable
qualification that the forum chosen, whether state or federal, should not oppressively
burden the defendant. The interpretation given in the Kepter case allows the original
plaintiff an inequitable use of a legal right and opens the door to ambulance chasing."
It can hardly be supposed that Congress, by giving the plaintiff an option to sue in any
district in which the railroad shall be doing business, intended to subject railroads to
suits in any forum, however inconvenient, in which the plaintiff might expect to find a
more favorable jury or a larger verdict. 2 Congress under the commerce clause 3 has
power to burden interstate commerce to this extent,4 but it is submitted that the
statute could be construed simply as providing for the venue rather than the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the act.'s Consequently, even though it may be im6McConnell v. Thomson, 2r3 Ind. 16, 8 N.E. (2d) 986 (i937).
7Ex parte Crandall, 52 F. (2d) 65o (D.C. Ind. 193i), aff'd 53 F. (2d)969 (C.C.A. 7th i931).
8Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); note 5 supra.
9 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Vigor, go F. (2d) 7 (C.C.A. 6th 1937); Southern R. Co. v.
Cochran, 56 F. (2d) ior9 (C.C.A. 6th 1932); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 292 Fed.
326 (C.C.A. 8th 1923); McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 8 N.E. (2d) 986 (1937).
10 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C.C.A. 8th 1923). Compare
the situation where a state by statute cannot force a corporation to give up its right to go into
the federal court as a condition of doing business in the state. Terral v. Burke Construction
Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922).
"Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. ,
34 (i929).
2 Ibid.
X3U.S.

Const. art. I, § 8 (3).

Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Chesapeake & 0. R.
Co. v. Vigor, go F. (2d) 7 (C.C.A. 6th 1937).
ISCf. argument of railroad in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (W.Va.
1941).
'4
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proper for the federal court to dismiss a suit under the act, 6 it does not follow that the
plaintiff has a federal right to choose a venue irrespective of the burden thereby placed
on the defendant. Resort to the state court of the plaintiff's domicil is the defendant's
only protection against such a burden.
But if the state court's injunction is held void, as was done in the Kepner and Painter cases, the procedure followed in the Paintercase seems to be a suitable solution, in
the event that state courts continue to issue injunctions. While it is not clear that federal courts have statutory power to enjoin in this situation, it would seem that the
statutes might well be so construed. Section 262 of the Judicial Code7 empowers federal courts to issue all writs necessary to protect their jurisdiction. On the other hand,
Section 265 of the code 8 expressly provides that no injunction shall issue against a
state court except in bankruptcy proceedings. Section 265 has been construed in conjunction with Section 262,' 9 and three exceptions have been grafted onto the former.20
The federal court in the Painter case has created a reasonable fourth exception, inasmuch as a more flagrant interference with the jurisdiction of the federal court can hardly be imagined than the issuance by a state court of a void injunction against the prosecution of a pending suit in the federal court. 2" Moreover, the threat of a counter-injunction issuing by a federal court against a defendant engaged in interstate commerce may be enough to deter a railroad from seeking the assistance of the state court
of the plaintiff's domicil.
The Kepner case, however, may well be overruled and state court injunctions rendered valid, when the issue is again presented to the United States Supreme Court. In
that event, the issuance of a second injunction by the federal court might lead to practical difficulties. The courts of the state issuing the injunction are adequate for appealing the injunction without recourse to the federal courts. 2 It is true that an economic
argument against appeal through the state system is that the burden and expense of
the appeal are upon the plaintiff as opposed to the railroad. However, in the two
principal cases the plight of the plaintiff is not convincing when it is realized that the
action of the plaintiff was in the first place inequitable. It may likewise be urged that
x6 Southern

R. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F.

(2d)

ioi9 (C.C.A. 6th

1932);

Schendel v. McGee,

300 Fed. 273 (C.C.A. 8th 1924).
1736 Stat. 1162 (Igi1), 28 U.S.C.A. § 377 (I928).
' s36 Stat. 1162 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 379 (I928).
'9 Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 26o U.S. 226 (1922); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C.C.A. 8th 1932).
2o Besides bankruptcy proceedings the federal courts may enjoin state court suits which

interfere with the res under the jurisdiction of the federal court, those which would deny the
plaintiff in thefederal court a defense such as fraud in the procuring of a judgment, and those
in which the proceeding has been lawfully removed to the federal court.
2 But see the reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bryant v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 92 F. (2d) 569 (i937), where, on a set of facts almost identical to
those in the Painter case, the court refused to issue a counter-injunction. The more difficult
case would be when a state court attempts to enjoin the institution of suit in an out-of-state
federal court, but it would seem that the federal court should have power to issue a counterinjunction here also.
"Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 92 F. (2d) 569 (C.C.A. 2d 1937); Ex parte Crandall,
53 F. (2d) 969 (C.C.A. 7 th r931).
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the counter-injunction might lead to such an impasse that proceedings under the act
would be suspended, and the entire situation reduced to a bickering over jurisdiction,
entirely unbecoming to the dignity of our judicial system.
Another solution to the problems presented in the principal cases, whether state
court injunctions are held valid or invalid, would of course be a redrafting of Section 56
to provide for suit against the defendant railroad in the district of the residence of the
defendant or in which the cause of action arose, or, if neither of these are suitable, in
the nearest convenient district in which the defendant shall be doing business at the
time of commencing such action. Or if the existing statute were construed as giving
the federal courts discretion to dismiss suits brought under the act, instead of making
the exercise of jurisdiction mandatory,23 a plea of forum non conveniens like that
which operates at civil law might also afford a solution.24

Procedure-Tolling of the Statute of Limitations-Foreign Corporation Ceasing to
Do Business within State-[Minnesota].-The plaintiff sued to recover the purchase
price on a sale of securities made illegal by the Minnesota Blue Sky Law.' The
defendant, a New York corporation, after the cause of action accrued, formally ceased
doing business in Minnesota. As a statutory qualification for selling securities in
Minnesota, it had irrevocably appointed the commissioner of securities as its agent
for service of process, 2 and in compliance with statutory provisions for withdrawing
from the state, it appointed the secretary of state its agent for service of process in
actions arising from business transacted in Minnesota.3 The statutory period for suing
on a liability created by statute had elapsed,4 and the defendant pleaded the statute
of limitations as a defense. The plaintiff demurred on the ground that the defendant
was "out of the state" within the meaning of the tolling provision of the statute of
limitationss and that in consequence the statutory period bad not "run." On appeal
23

Note 6 supra.

24Foster, The Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 12X7 (1930); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. i (1929).

xMinn. Stat. (Mason, 3927) § 3996-4. The statute requires certain securities to be registered before they are sold. The defendant sold such securities without registering them. The
plaintiff sued as one of the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect and also
on a claim of fraud. The latter claim was not stressed at trial because the former was a sufficient basis for recovery if the plaintiff's action was not barred by the statute of limitations.
The sole question involved in this appeal, whether the statute of limitations had tolled, has
been an issue in nine cases, including the instant one, having similar fact situations and involving the interpretation of the same Minnesota statutes. City Co. of New York, Inc. v.
Stem, iio F. (2d) 6oi (C.C.A. 8th i94o); Chase Securities Corp. v. Vogel, iio F. (2d) 607
(C.C.A. 8th i94o); Shepard v. City Co. of New York, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 682 (Minn. X928);
Donaldson v. Chase Securities Corp., 296 N.W. 5i8 (Minn. i941). The other four cases in
lower state courts are unreported.
2Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 3996-l.
3 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 7494.
4Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 919i. The statutory period during which the action must
be brought is six years. The cause of action in the instant case accrued in April 1929, and the
defendant withdrew from the state in August I934.

s Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §9200.

